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INTRODUCTION
Firms erect governance structures to preserve their outcomes and interests against opportunistic behavior by other parties. Among the governance attributes are a number of relationship safeguards such as incentive structures, monitoring mechanisms, contractual provisions, reputations, norms, interpersonal trust, and other internal processes. These safeguards function to make principals and agents reach agreements and honor them by (1) reducing opportunism ex post (that is once, the relationship is in place) and (2) coordinating and motivating the parties' exchange activities and processes. Yet some ex post opportunism will exist in the exchange in spite of the firm's best efforts to eliminate it. This premise is fundamental to transaction cost economics and has been verified in empirical research to date. Therefore it is surprising that few, if any, studies explicitly test or investigate the capability of relationship safeguards to preserve the firm's outcomes from this "residual" opportunism.
Can the safeguards that exist in the exchange protect valuable relationship outcomes that are built up over time? Can the performance and continuity of the exchange be sustained given varying levels of ex post opportunism? These questions motivate this research. We contend that the presence of ex post opportunism in interorganizational relationships can change the production-enhancing capabilities of relationship safeguards put in place earlier in the relationship. This research tests interactions rather than main effects. To test this proposition, we collect primary measures of ex post opportunism and relationship attributes (safeguards) from industrial buyers and their suppliers in multiple sectors. We index relationship states (safeguards and ex post opportunism) at one point in time and assess performance and continuity expectations one year later. The longitudinal approach makes the temporal order between the independent and dependent variables explicit and enables us to rule out alternative temporal causal orderings.
We consider three relationship safeguards that have received considerable attention in the literature on interorganizational exchange: bilateral, relationship-specific investments, goal congruence, and interpersonal trust. These safeguards come from the dominant theoretical perspectives on exchange in the interorganizational literature: TCE, agency theory, and relationship marketing, respectively. The primary contribution of this work rests in its ability to demonstrate that some safeguards become more potent (better able to enhance performance and continuity) as opportunism increases, while others lose their efficacy in the face of rising opportunism. We develop the theoretical framework for these effects.
This work also contributes to two important streams of research. The first is a growing interest in the explicit role of ex post opportunism in interorganizational exchange. A literature review by Wathne & Heide (2000) represents the most comprehensive approach to this area. They overview original and emergent conceptualizations of the opportunism construct in interorganizational relationships, describing passive and active ex post opportunism in existing and new relationships and strategies for containing it, as well as the conditions under which it is likely to occur. The current research extends the thinking in this area by investigating the capability of various relationship safeguards to preserve outcomes in the presence of ex post opportunism perceptions.
The second emerging stream of research concerns the "dark side" of interorganizational relationships (Grayson & Ambler 1999; Ping 1993) . The key idea in this stream is that, over time, ongoing business exchanges often develop characteristics that serve to destabilize and ultimately destroy the relationship from within. This phenomenon is gaining attention in many literatures, such as strategic management (e.g., Inkpen & Beamish 1997) , marketing (Grayson & Ambler 1999; Moorman, Zaltman & Deshpande 1992) , psychology (Ephross & Vassill 1993) , and new institutional economics (e.g., Klein 1996; Williamson 1996) , although no consensus exists as to how a dark side emerges and develops over time. In this research, we view the growth of ex post opportunism as evidence of the onset of the "dark side" of ongoing relationships, and we consider how relationship safeguards mitigate the associated consequences.
Without a critical assessment of the production-enhancing capability of relationship safeguards given the phenomenon of ex post opportunism, we run the risk of encouraging naïve (especially utopian) forms of organization; prominent and insistent provision needs to be made for opportunism. This research offers remedies for managing and mitigating the onset of the dark side of relationships among firms. The longitudinal test of the ability of various relationship safeguards to preserve valuable relationship outcomes over time informs our understanding of how such safeguards interact with ongoing levels of ex post opportunism and offers a "light side" to the maladies that can arise in the course of an ongoing relationship.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This research takes the perspective of a focal firm in an interorganizational relationship that reports on its own position, the dyad's circumstances, and the behavior of its exchange counterpart.
The focal firm is a financially independent actor (a buyer or supplier) in a vertical exchange relationship. Although the buyer and supplier organizations differ in the functions they perform, symmetry is expected in the nature and pattern of causation of the behavioral constructs that underlie their relationship.
In this section, we define the central constructs of our theoretical framework and develop hypotheses. We begin with a brief review of ex post opportunism and the dependent variables of interest. We then describe three relationship safeguards and how their ability to promote exchange outcomes differs with varying levels of opportunism in the exchange.
EX POST OPPORTUNISM
Opportunism is self-interest seeking with guile. In practice, it involves several elements: One is distortion of information, including such overt behaviors as lying, cheating, and stealing, as well as more subtle behaviors such as misrepresenting information by avoiding full disclosure. Another behavior is reneging on explicit or implicit commitments such as shirking, or failing to fulfill promises and obligations. Either party in an exchange can engage in opportunism before the firms transact (ex ante opportunism), or after the transaction is underway (ex post opportunism). We focus on the latter. We open the door for many interesting problems of economic organization that might be missed or misconstrued when one ignores the presence of opportunism.
Empirical research on ex post opportunism remains sparse, despite its prominence in the literature and the marketplace. Many studies invoke ex post opportunism as a theoretical mechanism (Fein & Anderson 1996; Stump & Heide 1996 are examples), but few studies index opportunism explicitly. Selfish motivations and guile are difficult to study directly, 1 as respondents who report on their own level of self-interest are subject to a social desirability bias. Two solutions to this problem have emerged. One approach is to collect direct reports on one's own opportunism, but to couch questions in innocuous language, avoiding terms that evoke ethical considerations (e.g., John 1984 ).
An alternative approach is to ask respondents to report on the opportunism of other parties in an exchange (e.g., Anderson 1988; Smith & Barclay 1997) . Our approach takes this latter path; we ask buyers and suppliers to report not on their own but on their counterpart's ex post opportunistic behavior in an exchange.
EXCHANGE OUTCOMES
Exchange offers many benefits, including economically significant outcomes and expectations of relationship continuity. We examine four short-and long-term economic and strategic outcomes: (i) evaluations of the counterpart's performance, (ii) the achievement of competitive advantages, (iii) joint profit performance, and (iv) expectations of relationship continuity.
The firm's evaluation of the counterpart's performance is an economically significant shortterm outcome. This outcome is individual, reflecting the view of the focal firm alone. It is a holistic representation, entailing a rough comparison of benefits against costs; a positive evaluation justifies involvement in a collaboration. The firm's assessment of the value it derives from the relationship may differ markedly from the added value generated by the dyad. This difference arises because one firm may appropriate a disproportionate share of the jointly generated returns. For example, Kalwani & Narayandas (1995) present evidence that buyers benefit disproportionately in supply alliances.
Competitive advantages are strategic benefits gained over competing firms, such as superior access to resources, decreased supply and inventory costs, or the development of unique process technologies. In supply relationships, a well-coordinated pairing can yield competitive advantages that neither party could realize without its alliance (Dyer 1995; Jap 1999) . Competitive advantages are long-term and accrue to the dyad, thereby enabling the firms to compete more effectively in the marketplace (Sethuraman, Anderson, & Narus 1988) . Although these advantages may eventually be reflected in joint profit, financial performance and strategic performance are not perfectly correlated.
To capture strategic performance, it is necessary to go beyond accounting-based concepts (Venkatraman & Ramanujam 1986 , Anderson 1990 ).
Joint profit performance results from joint efforts in exchange. No mere summation of the two firm's individually realizable profits, it instead indexes financial outcomes that result from the interdependence of effort and investments that reside within the dyad. The expectation of higher joint profits, either through lower costs or high revenues, provides a major motive for long-term relationships (Oliver 1990 ). However, the literature on relationships has understudied the degree to which these expectations are met (Geyskens, Steenkamp, & Kumar 1999 ). This neglect is particularly the case for results at the level of the dyad, rather than at the level of one player (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford 1995) .
The firm's expectation of relationship continuity reflects the focal firm's perspective of the long-term viability of the relationship. When a firm expects that the relationship will continue into the future, it is more willing to engage in processes and to make investments that will enhance the relationship in the long run (Anderson & Weitz 1989 , Heide & Miner 1992 . Although confidence in the future of the relationship is not a performance outcome, it is important; without it, the firms adopt a short time horizon and refuse to engage in activities that do not pay off quickly and with certainty (Williamson 1993) .
RELATIONSHIP SAFEGUARDS
We focus on three safeguards that have been widely considered in the literature on interorganizational relationships: bilateral idiosyncratic investments, goal congruence, and interpersonal trust. Wathne & Heide (2000) classify these under the rubric of incentives (bilateral investments) and socialization mechanisms (goal congruence, interpersonal trust). We choose this subset of the large number of potential safeguards because they possess varying properties that may influence performance outcomes in different ways. Idiosyncratic (relationship-specific) investments are non-fungible signals of commitment that create economic losses if the relationship is prematurely terminated. In contrast, goal congruence is a latent sociological mechanism that motivates specific behaviors in an exchange. These attributes are organization-level. In contrast, interpersonal trust operates at the level of the individual boundary spanner in each organization. These personal ties matter because repeated interactions typically evolve into institutionalized processes and organizational structures and routines (Zucker 1987) . These three safeguards take time to develop and serve to preserve the outcomes of an exchange (Chiles & McMackin 1996) . They arise partly by design and partly as a result of processes management does not fully control. Because they differ significantly, each safeguard may vary in its ability to preserve valuable relationship outcomes under fluctuating levels of ex post opportunism.
Bilateral idiosyncratic investments occur when a buyer and supplier both make idiosyncratic investments in the relationship. These investments may be tangible (e.g., a manufacturing facility, a specific tool, die, or machine), or intangible (e.g., tacit knowledge, a specific technology, or capability). When both sides to an exchange make the investments, the investments serve as mutual hostages or as credible commitments by each party to the relationship (Anderson & Weitz 1992; Williamson 1983) , motivating the parties to make the relationship work. Thus, bilateral investments that are difficult to redeploy serve to sustain performance outcomes, and expectations of continued exchange into the future are well-founded (Heide & John 1990 , Noordewier, John & Nevin 1990 (Ping & Dwyer 1992 , Williamson 1985 , 1993 .
H1: Bilateral idiosyncratic investments will be less strongly (less positively) associated with exchange outcomes as ex post opportunism increases.
Goal congruence. Agency theory notes that whenever cooperating parties differ in their division of labor, goal conflicts can create incentives for shirking and moral hazard (Bergen, Dutta, & Walker 1992) . The objectives of exchange for buyers and suppliers are typically at odds with each other. In general, buyers desire more (quality, service, customization, risk assumption, and so forth)
for less (lower prices), while suppliers strive to achieve the sale with the highest profit margins or revenue potential. By developing goal congruence between the parties--the extent to which firms perceive the possibility of achieving compatible, if not identical, objectives (Eliashberg & Michie 1984; Schmidt & Kochan 1977) --the incentive for opportunism can be curbed (though not eliminated). 3 Goal congruence can also enhance exchange outcomes by providing direction for the activities and efforts of the dyad. This congruence is particularly key and salient in the early stages of a relationship. For example, in the exploration phase, the parties engage in active communication of expectations and bargaining of the distribution of benefits, obligations, and burdens. Establishing goal congruence can direct the nature, direction, and magnitude of these aspects of the relationship as the parties build up the exchange over time. In this manner, goal congruence can improve the joint returns of both parties.
Once achieved, these common goals may come to be taken for granted as long as ex post opportunism is low (the scenario of "all is well"). As the relationship reaches maturity, the dyad focuses on day-to-day activities and ongoing operations; goal congruence may lose its salience, moving from the foreground to the background of the relationship and assuming a taken-for-granted quality (Neilsen & Rao 1987) .
However, as some degree of opportunism develops ex post, goal congruence, where it exists, may become salient, invoked as a means by which to evaluate and understand the counterpart's deviation in behavior. By reminding both parties of their existing goal congruence, the focal party can also enhance the day-to-day functioning of ongoing exchanges between organizations, such that the organizations continue to relate in a manner consistent with their shared goals. Thus, we hypothesize H2: Goal congruence will be more strongly (more positively) associated with exchange outcomes as ex post opportunism increases.
Interpersonal trust. One of the most widely recognized social norms for governing exchange is trust (Smith, Carroll & Ashford 1995) . We employ a composite working definition of trust developed by Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) : trust is a party's willingness to be vulnerable to another party's actions based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other party. This definition matches empirical operationalizations, which emphasize the honesty (the reliability of the partner's actions) and benevolence (willingness to look out for the focal firm's interests) aspects of trust (Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 1998) . Trust differs from opportunism: trust is a broad, "meso" or meta, concept, with many facets and levels. In contrast, opportunism is more delimited and behavioral in nature. It is observable by the focal firm and is grounded in specific actions.
Opportunism should create reduced attributions of trust. However, the sources of trust are many, complex, and ill-understood (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies 1998 ).
We cast opportunism as an organizational construct, characterizing the activities of the firm.
In contrast, we consider trust to be interpersonal: it occurs between two people who function as principal players on behalf of the buyer and the supplier. Dirks and Ferrin (2002) review empirical research on the role of interpersonal trust in organizational settings. They note that "conventional wisdom" claims that trust between people (rather than organizations) enhances organizational outcomes, although the empirical evidence to this effect is mixed. Multiple mechanisms are posited: the dominant viewpoint is that trusting individuals take risks on behalf of their organizations, risks which pay off more often than not. Dirks and Ferrin (2002) note evidence that interpersonal trust often persists in spite of evidence of some opportunism. Hence, we expect that when ex post opportunism is low, trust can safeguard exchange outcomes.
However, when the firm suspects opportunism in an exchange counterpart, this suspicion may inhibit the ability of interpersonal trust to generate performance and extend the relationship's time horizon. The "relationship custodian," the individual responsible for the day-to-day functioning and ongoing maintenance of the relationship (Ping & Dwyer 1992) , may call on other individuals (inside or outside the company) who have the power to terminate the relationship, restore equity, or find alternative solutions to ex post opportunism. This inclusion of additional individuals may cause circumstances to grow rapidly outside the trusting individual's control as the relationship is subjected to greater scrutiny. Questions will be asked by these additional organizational members and they will be called in to investigate, offer opinions, and ultimately intervene. Thus, the impact of relational processes developed by trusting individuals may be diminished as more role partners (e.g., supervisors, executive managers, and division leaders) assert themselves in response to signs of trouble. This reasoning suggests:
H3: Interpersonal trust will be less strongly (less positively) associated with exchange outcomes as ex post opportunism rises.
METHOD DATA COLLECTION AND SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
The tests of hypotheses are conducted using a longitudinal survey methodology with the procurement divisions of four Fortune 50 manufacturing companies: a computer (PC) manufacturer, a photography equipment manufacturer, a chemical manufacturer, and a brewery. 4 Each firm was offered an executive summary, presentation of results, and customized analyses in return for its participation. A one-year lag was used because pretest interviews suggested that considerable variation in outcomes, from no change to disintegration of the relationship, is possible within this time frame. 5 In order to maximize the sample size and minimize potential attrition effects at time two, 200 buyers from across the four firms were asked to report on two different supply relationships, creating an initial sampling frame of 400 dyadic relationships.
Procedure. Questionnaires were mailed to the buyers along with a pre-addressed, postagepaid envelope, a cover letter from the researchers, and a memorandum from corporate executives requesting participation and assuring the confidentiality of their individual responses. The buyers were instructed to identify a supply relationship and a contact individual at the supplier firm as a reference point for completing the items and questions. When the buyer surveys were returned, a parallel survey was sent to individuals in the supplier firms. This survey identified the buyer firm and individual respondent. Hence, both the buyer and supplier acted as focal parties, using the other (their counterpart) as a reference point for their respective surveys.
Sample characteristics. Two hundred seventy-five buyer surveys were returned at time 1 (a 69% response rate), followed by the mailing of 275 corresponding supplier surveys, of which 220
were completed (an 80% response rate). At time two, the prior 275 buyers were surveyed, with 167 returned (61% response). Of the 220 corresponding suppliers surveyed a year later, 154 responded (70% response). These dyads had worked with each other an average of 3.7 years. Annual transactions between the buyer and supplier involved over $63 million in materials and services, such as capital equipment, components, services, and maintenance, repair and operating supplies. These characteristics suggest that the sample has a significant base of history and a variety of exchange experience.
We consider the possibility that relationships with higher ex post opportunism at time 1 may have terminated, leaving only the healthier relationships in the sample at time 2. This is examined by comparing the mean of opportunism for the respondents at time 1 who did not respond at time 2 with the mean at time 1 among the remaining respondents: no significant difference emerged. This lack of a significant difference suggests that relationships with higher opportunism are represented to the same degree at time 2. One year of operating under ex post opportunism does not radically alter the makeup of the sample.
Respondent competence. We consider the respondent's competency and knowledge of the phenomena under investigation. The global measure was the respondent's tenure with a firm. Buyer respondents averaged 11.2 years of experience in their area and had been with their companies 20.9 years on average. Supplier respondents averaged 15.1 years of experience and 14.2 years of employment with their companies. This experience suggests that our respondents are qualified to act as key informants. Furthermore, specific measures of the respondent's knowledge of major issues were assessed at time 2 (cf., Jap 1999). The survey stated, "How knowledgeable are you about the following in your firm's relationship with the buyer/supplier firm?" Below we listed items such as "how similar their goals are," "the nature of unique investments, assets, capabilities, etc. that are used in the relationship," or "the degree to which they have earned strategic advantages over their competitors," with responses indicated from 1 (Not Very Knowledgeable) to 7 (Very Knowledgeable). The average response to these scales was 5.6, with no significant differences between buyers and suppliers. Collectively, assurance exists that the selected informants were competent and relatively involved in completing the survey.
QUESTIONNAIRE AND SCALE DEVELOPMENT
Scale items. All of the informants completed identically worded, multiple-item, 7-point scale measures reflecting the view of the focal firm. Some measures (e.g., the achievement of competitive advantages, joint profit performance) were designed to reflect the focal firm's perspective on aspects of the dyadic relationship between the firms --what the two organizations are doing together.
Interpersonal trust is captured at the level of the individual informants. All of the constructs were measured at time 1 and time 2. Scale items from past research in interorganizational relations were used whenever possible. All other scales were created for the purpose of this study. Appendix 1 presents the scale items and reliabilities. The estimated reliabilities for the constructs are high, averaging .84, with a range of .76 to .91. Variance is relatively high (average=1.32; range 1.02 to 1.56) around the construct means.
Collectively, significant heterogeneity appears to exist in the range of values reflected by these measures.
MEASUREMENT MODEL
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) techniques are used to estimate a first order, latent factor measurement model comprised of the three relationship safeguards, ex post opportunism, and four relationship outcomes for all informants. The model uses the covariance matrix of the observable indicators of each latent construct; the factor loadings, measurement errors and correlations between each construct are then estimated via full-information maximum-likelihood (FIML) in LISREL 8.3 (Jöreskog & Sörbom 1993) . Each buyer survey is treated as an independent response throughout the analysis in order to provide the large sample size necessary for stable parameter estimation.
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The overall chi-square for this model is 1180.16 (467 df, p<0 (Steiger 1980) . All the factor loadings and measurement errors are in acceptable ranges and significant at α=.05, providing evidence of convergent validity.
Discriminant validity among the constructs is stringently examined using the procedure recommended by Fornell & Larcker (1981) . Every pair of latent factors passes this test.
STRUCTURAL MODEL ANALYSES: STRATEGY OF ESTIMATION
To examine the hypotheses, we model the performance outcomes at time 2 of firms' relationship safeguards and ex post opportunism at time 1 using the covariance matrix of the observed variables. One might argue that time 2 variables are related to performance variables at time 1. The theory behind this paper suggests that this argument is probably correct, but what is the source of performance at time 1? The theory would have it that performance at time t is related to safeguards at time t-1. For any time series, the causal chain would be that lagged performance (one period) occurs due to lagged relationship safeguards (two periods). This pattern of nearly infinite regress is consistent with autocorrelated performance after the first two periods of a time series. The only way to be certain about the causal order is to go back to the point of initial causation between the predictors and the outcomes. This solution is, of course, impractical. However, if our data indicate significance between a set of predictors and outcome variables over a one-year time period, we might infer that the statistical significance between our predictor and outcome variables is mirrored throughout similar subsequent time periods from t 0 . Collectively, over many time periods, they would demonstrate that the hypothesized predictors drive specific outcomes over time, controlling for the effects of inertia.
The conceptual discussion hypothesizes that the capability of relationship safeguards to enhance exchange outcomes will differ at varying levels of ex post opportunism. The single-group estimation evaluates the extent to which the hypothesized structural model can account for the covariance matrix when each of the two groups (higher and lower ex post opportunism) is estimated separately. A model that fits each group well suggests that the structural specification is appropriate: of course, the estimates of the model may differ substantially in each group. If the structural model fits well in each group singly, we proceed to a two-group estimation process in which the structural model is simultaneously estimated under both groups (higher and lower) with all gamma coefficients (12 in each group) freely estimated. This simultaneous estimation of both groups represents the baseline, two-group model from which nested tests of model and parameter equivalence are made. Another model is estimated, in which each pair of the estimated gamma coefficients is constrained to be equal, to assess whether the effects differ across the two groups. A significant decline in fit indicates differences across the groups, a necessary condition for moderating effects.
Having established between-group differences in parameter effects for the entire structural model, we then turn our attention to the tests of separate hypotheses. Family-wise tests are conducted of the impact of each governance mechanism at time 1 on outcomes at time 2. For each governance mechanism, non-equivalence across higher and lower ex post opportunism groups for the set of four endogenous variables provides evidence of an interaction effect. Where interaction effects exist for a governance mode, we then consider the equivalence of specific parameters across higher and lower levels of opportunism, so as to better understand the nature of the interaction. This process indicates which parameters do not interact and therefore should be constrained to be equal across the two groups. This information is then incorporated into the final two-group model. The specific parameters of this model are discussed. Jaccard, Turrisi, & Wan (1990) note that, for several reasons, this analysis strategy provides the best approach for contrasting several path coefficients across multiple groups. First, models incorporating interactions are prone to Type II error (false negatives), in part because they are sensitive to measurement error. The LISREL framework incorporates measurement error into the estimation of all variables except the latent moderator. Second, most methods of modeling interactions involve a single dependent variable (and often a single independent variable). In contrast, our conceptual model is a causal system of four dependent and three independent variables.
A split-group analysis in LISREL permits formal comparison of entire causal models, simultaneously estimated for two or more groups defined by a moderator variable. This model is a complex structure. To estimate it simultaneously for both groups, incorporating measurement error, is to offer a powerful and parsimonious test.
The drawbacks of a split-group approach are that (i) splitting into two groups lowers statistical power, and (ii) measurement error in the moderating variable is not accounted for.
However, if the coefficients differ across the groups, this discrepancy would indicate that both lower power and failure to take measurement error into account are not problematic. The general view is that differences in parameter coefficients across the two groups furnish satisfactory evidence for interaction effects.
Since no theory exists to suggest that the effects of relationship safeguards differ on either side of the dyad, the buyers and suppliers are pooled in this analysis to maximize power. 8 Only those observations with complete data at both time 1 and 2 are retained (n=321). The sample is split into two groups along the median of the opportunism scale. The median level at time 1 in the total sample was rather low, at 1.9 (minimum=1, maximum=6.6). This low level is to be expected in established ongoing supply relationships (Heide 1994) . Williamson (1993) notes that ex post opportunism in ongoing exchange is never zero. However, such opportunism could not be too high, or else the parties would not transact.
We refer to the group above the median as "higher" and the group below the median as "lower," recognizing that these terms are relative. In essence, higher opportunism at time 1 reflects the onset of the dark side (i.e., "trouble is brewing") as opposed to rampant opportunism, which may characterize relationships in decline. Lower levels of opportunism reflect healthier relationship circumstances (i.e., "things are all right"). A visual inspection of the frequency distributions of the relational safeguards above and below the opportunism median indicates no range restriction of the distribution of relationship safeguards.
STRUCTURAL MODEL ANALYSES: ESTIMATION RESULTS

Single group estimation.
A structural model of the conceptual framework is estimated once for each group under higher (n=151) and lower (n=170) ex post opportunism. Correlations among the three relationship safeguards, as well as correlations among the four relationship outcomes, are freely estimated to account for the fact that these factors are related to each other in the research context. In the higher opportunism group, the chi-square for the structural model is 481.72 (254 df, p<.001). The CFI and IFI is .89, the TLI=.87, and the RMSEA is .071. 9 In the lower opportunism group, the chi-square for the structural model is 500.23 (254 df, p<.001), the CFI and IFI is .89, the TLI=.87, and the RMSEA .077. Taken together, these results suggest that the structural model accounts well for the covariance structure in each group (higher and lower opportunism).
Two-group estimation. Two models are initially estimated in the two-group estimation process. The first is a baseline model, in which the structural model is simultaneously estimated for both higher and lower ex post opportunism and the impacts of relationship safeguards at time 1 on outcomes at time 2 (12 gamma coefficients) are freely estimated across the groups. This model has a chi-square of 981.95 (508 df, p<0), with a CFI of .89, IFI of .89, and TLI of .87. The RMSEA is .074. Thus, the two group model provides a satisfactory fit to the data. In the second model specified, all the gamma coefficients are constrained to be equal across higher and lower levels of ex post opportunism. Equivalence of parameters indicates no differences across the two groups, and hence no potential for interaction effects. The chi-square of this constrained model is compared to the baseline model and the difference in chi-squares --the Likelihood Ratio --tests the null hypothesis that the parameters are equivalent. The LR test is 23.3, (12 df, p<.05), suggesting that there are differences in the parameters across the two groups.
Parameter tests. Given differences across groups, we then consider differences among parameters across groups in two steps. We first conduct a family-wise test of the impact of a specific governance mechanism (four gamma parameters) at time 1 on the outcomes at time 2. If the familywise test indicates the presence of an interaction, we examine the nature of the interaction by conducting individual parameter tests of equivalence.
For the first hypothesis, we constrain the gamma coefficients for bilateral idiosyncratic investments (γ 11 , γ 21 , γ 31 and γ 41 ) to be equal across the higher and lower ex post opportunism groups and simultaneously estimate the two-group structural model. The LR statistic is not significant (χ 2 = 3.92, 4df, ns). Thus, no support emerges for the moderating effect proposed in hypothesis 1. Table 2A and 2B. Table   2A contains the parameters that represent the test of hypotheses, while Table 2B contains all other parameter estimates under higher and lower opportunism.
Bilateral idiosyncratic investments at time 1 have a significant, positive impact on evaluation of the counterpart's performance (γ 11 = .13, p<.05), achievement of competitive advantages (γ 21 = .51, p<.01), joint profit performance (γ 31 = .27, p<.01), and continuity expectations (γ 41 = .31, p<.01) at time 2. These effects remain unchanged, at higher or lower levels of ex post opportunism.
The pattern of effects is very different for goal congruence. Examination of these parameters suggests that, at higher levels of opportunism, goal congruence at time 1 yields a greater impact on outcomes at time 2 for two out of the four parameters. When opportunism at time 1 is low, the impact of goal congruence on all four outcomes at time 2 is not significant. However, at higher levels, the impact of goal congruence becomes positive and significant for evaluation of the counterpart's performance (γ 11 = .20, p<.05) and achievement of competitive advantages (γ 21 = .19, p<.05) at time 2.
The impact of interpersonal trust at time 1 on outcomes at time 2 also differs as a function of the increase in ex post opportunism. However, the trend among the parameter coefficients is reversed. When opportunism is lower, interpersonal trust at time 1 has a significant, positive effect on all four performance outcomes at time 2: evaluation of the counterpart's performance (γ 13 = .94, p<.01), achievement of competitive advantages (γ 23 = .51, p<.01), joint profit performance (γ 33 = .37, p<.05), and expectations of relationship continuity (γ 43 = .63, p<.01). However, at higher levels of opportunism, the impact of trust at time 1 is significantly reduced for evaluations of the counterpart's performance (γ 13 = .32, p<.01), competitive advantages (γ 23 = .04, ns), joint profits (γ 33 = .06, ns), and continuity expectations (γ 41 = .14, ns). Hence, we see that interpersonal trust fails to safeguard all four outcomes as effectively under higher levels of ex post opportunism. Interpersonal trust is thus a stronger safeguard under lower opportunism.
In Appendix 2, we conduct additional tests of the model's robustness using nested, single variable regressions, and we test for alternative explanations for the results, such as ceiling effects, regression to the mean, changes in opportunism over time, and differences among buyers and suppliers. Briefly, we find that the model is robust and that no support for such alternative explanations exists.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
How well do relationship safeguards function to preserve the performance and the continuity expectations that business-to-business supply relationships generate? Do these safeguards become more or less effective as realized opportunism mounts? Our results indicate that under the dark-side scenario, suppliers and buyers perceiving their business goals as aligned fare better than firms that perceive their goals to be incompatible. In the face of opportunism, goal-congruent parties appear to judge their partners' performance more favorably and to see a longer time horizon to their relationship. Goal congruence appears to function as a way for firms to achieve coordination in spite of extant opportunism, offering a "light side" to the onset of the dark side in ongoing relationships.
Strikingly, these benefits of goal congruence do not materialize when all is well. Perhaps goal congruence fades into the background, to become taken for granted. Minus any substantial opportunism, goal-congruent and incongruent parties do not differ in time horizon or counterpart performance ratings.
Interpersonal trust appears to do the reverse. When all is well, the confidence that two individuals place in each other makes the relationship perform better in every respect. The counterpart's performance is better, more competitive advantages are achieved by the pairing, joint profits are higher, and the relationship is expected to last longer. But these effects apparently diminish, even evaporate, as ex post opportunism mounts. It is likely that when trouble occurs, more players enter: examining, questioning, and intervening vis-a-vis the relationship. As additional players enter, the relationship custodians may no longer expect honesty and benevolence from each other. That the relationship custodians expect honesty and benevolence from each other as additional players enter loses relevance and impact.
In contrast, bilateral idiosyncratic investments provide a powerful safeguard, apparently able to enhance all performance outcomes and to extend the time horizon of the relationship. Over the range of ex-post opportunism observed here (from virtually nil to small), this effect does not shift. If, as we expected, these assets eventually become less potent drivers, it takes a much higher level of opportunism than normally enters an interorganizational relationship for this to occur. At high levels of opportunism, Williamson (1991) predicts the relationship will dissolve, to be replaced by either vertical integration or no further transactions. Perhaps substantial opportunism in interorganizational governance structures exists for too short a period for field studies to capture.
Limitations. One limitation to the study is that the survey methodology may have created common method variance that could have inflated construct relationships. To reduce inflation, most of the construct items were separated and mixed so that no one informant would be able to detect readily which items were affecting which factors. And the one-year interval between measurement of the dependent and independent variable makes it difficult for informants to manipulate their answers to maintain artificial concordance between measures. Hence, it is reasonable to expect that common method variance bias is minimized. Additional limitations include the fact that the research does not comprehensively consider all possible factors at work in the preservation of relational outcomes.
Instead, this work represents an incremental step toward better understanding of the complex phenomenon of preserving valuable outcomes achievable in ongoing industrial supply relationships.
1 The one exception to this pattern is Brown, Dev, and Lee (2000) , who query respondents directly in regard to their own opportunistic behavior.
2 Empirical results support the positive link between bilateral investments, commitment intentions, and joint activities in the domain of marketing activities. Gundlach, Achrol, and Mentzer (1995) found a positive relationship between joint inputs and long-term commitment intentions. Zaheer and Venkatraman (1995) show a strong correlation between reciprocal investments and joint action in the area of new product launches. 3 In this vein, Anderson (1988) finds that goal congruence is related in a non-linear way to opportunism; the more salespeople perceive alignment between their goals and the company's goals, the less opportunism they practice on the job -and at an increasing rate. 4 The identities of these four firms are disguised for confidentiality purposes. 5 A review of 27 longitudinal studies in organizational management indicates little consistency concerning an appropriate time interval (Williams and Podsakoff 1989) . Typically, lags are chosen out of convenience, not theory. 6 The complete data analysis was also conducted with truly independent buyer surveys --only one reported relationship per buyer (n=129), and the results did not differ significantly, so the multiple responses from buyers were retained. Differences in results among the four firms were also found to be nonsignificant. 7 Turrisi, Jaccard, and Wan (1991) state that the choice of moderator variables should be based on theory, rather than on statistical considerations. Because relationship safeguards take time to work their influence, opportunism at time 1 should be influenced by relationship safeguards in earlier time periods. What ex post opportunism exists at time 1 appears in spite of the dampening effects of earlier safeguards. This is why the ex post opportunism measure at time 1 serves as a moderator of the impact of relationship safeguards at time 1 on outcomes and continuity at time 2. Time 1 opportunism will exhibit some correlation with time 1 safeguards: this correlation is primarily because there is inertia in the safeguards. 8 We conduct a series of multigroup tests to evaluate the validity of this assumption. The results of this process indicate no significant differences in the models for buyers and suppliers. The details of this procedure are described in a later section. 9 Although CFI, IFI, and TLI values of .9 to 1 are generally recommended, in sample sizes of less than 200, these indices are unlikely to reach this rule-of-thumb benchmark; moreover, the IFI tends to favor simpler models (Bearden, Sharma and Teel 1982; Marsh, Balla, and Hau 1996) . .31** == .31** .19* -.13 ns .14 ns .63** Subscript j = 1, 2, or 3 for bilateral idiosyncratic investments, goal congruence, and interpersonal trust respectively. == indicates parameters that are constrained to be equivalent across higher/lower ex post opportunism groups. All other parameters are freely estimated across opportunism groups. * α=.05, ** α=.01, two-tailed t-test Chow test indicates significant difference in parameter estimates across higher and lower opportunism. tThe LISREL estimates are constrained across higher/lower ex post opportunism groups for this performance outcome, while the regression estimates (see Appendix 2) are freely estimated across opportunism groups.
APPENDIX 2 ASSESSMENT OF ROBUSTNESS AND ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
The robustness of the LISREL results is also assessed via a set of nested, single variable regressions, which involves a single-group estimation, estimation across two groups, and an examination of a family of parameters and individual parameters. Specifically, the following model is estimated: OUTCOME k2i = β 0 + β 1 INVEST 1i + β 2 GOAL 1i + β TRUST 1i + ε I where OUTCOME k2i refers to performance outcome k (evaluation of the counterpart's performance, achievement of competitive advantages, joint profit performance, or expectations of relationship continuity) at time 2 for focal party i.
INVEST 1i (bilateral, idiosyncratic investments), GOAL 1i (goal congruence), and TRUST 1i (interpersonal trust), are all measured for focal firm i at time 1. This basic model is estimated for each performance outcome at time 2 under higher and lower opportunism.
Estimation results. The result of the nested regressions essentially mirrors the LISREL results. As shown in Table 3 , the regression results, when estimated separately for higher and lower opportunism groups, are directionally similar and mirror the pattern of statistical significance for 21 of the 24 parameters that represent the tests of hypotheses.
Chow tests are conducted to compare the two groups in each equation. The general pattern is that the two groups are seldom statistically significantly different: they are usually poolable.
The Chow statistic does indicate statistically significant differences across higher and lower opportunism for the evaluation of the counterpart's performance in terms of the effect of goal congruence and interpersonal trust. The Chow statistic is marginally significant for the achievement of competitive advantages in terms of the effect of interpersonal trust, and not significant for the remaining outcomes. This lack of statistical significance may be due to the reduced power of the estimation in a regression context (whereas LISREL employs simultaneous estimation and incorporation of measurement error).
EXAMINATION OF ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Ceiling effects. Because the overall level of ex post opportunism is low, a ceiling effect might be operative in either of the opportunism groups, which would imply that in at least one opportunism group (particularly lower opportunism), the mean level of a given governance mechanism is so high that there is little scope for variation. If so, this lack of variation would attenuate the association of a governance mechanism with relationship outcomes in that group. If the ceiling effect does not hold in the other group, a difference in the impact of governance mechanism across opportunism levels may appear.
There are no significant differences (t=.4, ns) in the level of bilateral investments (average = 5.2) under higher or lower ex post opportunism. Levels of goal congruence and trust, however, do differ across higher and lower opportunism groups. Goal congruence has a mean of 4.7 (sd=1.1) under higher opportunism, and a mean of 5.7 (sd=.87) under lower opportunism. This difference is significant (t=-9.0, p<.00). Trust also demonstrates a significant difference (t=-8.4, p<.00) across higher (mean=5.6, sd=.86) and lower (mean=6.3, sd=.67) opportunism groups.
These differences suggest the possibility of ceiling effects in goal congruence or interpersonal trust. A ceiling effect is particularly plausible for interpersonal trust under lower opportunism, because it has the highest mean among all three relationship safeguards. Yet the results indicate that the impact of interpersonal trust under lower opportunism is significant, and for all four outcomes: evaluations of the counterpart's performance, achievement of competitive advantages, joint profit performance, and expectations of relationship continuity. This casts doubt on the possibility that a ceiling effect completely explains the lack of impact of goal congruence (where the mean is farther from the ceiling) on outcomes.
Dynamic changes. Could the impact of the relationship safeguards on performance across higher and lower levels of ex post opportunism be due to changes in the use of a mechanism over time? This possibility is considered by comparing the change in means of the relationship safeguards over time. At time 2, the mean level of bilateral investments is 5.3 (sd=1.2), not significantly different (t=1.6, p<.1) from time 1. The mean level of goal congruence at time 2 is 5.1 (sd=1.1), which is significantly lower (t=-2.1, p<.03) than time 1. The mean of interpersonal trust at time 2 is 6.0 (sd=1.0), not significantly different (t=-1.5, p<.12) from time. Thus, goal congruence is the only governance mechanism that differs in statistically significant fashion over time. However, in practice, a drop from 5.3 to 5.1 in goal congruence over time is not a substantial shift in terms of how the exchange is governed. Hence, the use of relationship safeguards appears stable over the time frame of the study.
We also investigate changes in ex post opportunism over time. Beginning with the overall means, there is a small, albeit statistically significant, rise in opportunism over time. At time 1, the mean of opportunism is 2.0.
1 This rises to 2.1 (sd=1.0) at time 2, which is significantly higher (t=2.2, p<.03) than at time 1. This increase is due to the lower opportunism group, in which there is a small (∆=.2), but statistically significant (t=2.2, p<.03) increase from time 1 to 2.
The mean of opportunism in the higher group does not significantly (t=-.51, n.s.) change over time. An inspection of individual differences in ex post opportunism also indicates that there are no large changes at the observation level.
Collectively, these results suggest that the mean level of ex post opportunism is stable, and that this stability is not due to large positive changes canceling out large negative changes. Ex post opportunism appears to be a stable phenomenon, not a transitory evaluation, based merely on recent incidences or isolated circumstance. Instead, these reports appear to be considered evaluations, developed over time as a reflection of the history that ensues between the firms.
Buyer and supplier differences. The analysis assumes that buyers and suppliers can be combined in a single model. We evaluate this assumption via a series of multi-group estimation tests. In the higher opportunism group, we simultaneously estimate the structural model for buyers and suppliers allowing all the effects of relationship safeguards at time 1 on outcomes at time 2 (the gamma coefficients) to be freely estimated. We then estimate a model in which one of the gamma coefficients is constrained to be equal across the two groups. We repeat this process for each parameter in turn, constraining it to be equal across the buyer and supplier groups and comparing the chi-square of this model to a model in which the parameter is freely estimated. An LR test is used to test the null hypothesis that the parameter is equivalent for buyers and suppliers. The entire procedure is then repeated for buyers and suppliers in the lower opportunism group. This process did not yield a single significant LR statistic, indicating that there are no differences in the effects of relationship safeguards on outcomes for buyers and suppliers. The lack of substantial differences found here suggests that buyers and suppliers are not characterized by fundamentally different processes and that pooling their responses to gain statistical power does not mask any significant differences across the dyad.
1 Table 1 shows a slightly higher mean: it is based only on complete observations at both time periods.
